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DON’T LEAVE US JUST YET:
FORUM NON CONVENIENS AND
THE FEDERAL COURT’S POWER
TO STAY AND MONITOR ACTIONS
IN THE “INTEREST OF JUSTICE”
Mark E. Gray*
The doctrine of forum non conveniens is best understood as a means to
“promote the ends of justice.” However, the doctrine’s modern
application and its interaction with another doctrine, the doctrine of
judgment enforcement, threatens foreign plaintiffs’ access to justice in
transnational-litigation matters. This threat is most evident in what has
been termed “boomerang litigation,” where foreign plaintiffs engage in
a roundtrip courtroom excursion, from America to a foreign judiciary
and then back to America for judgment enforcement. In the end, when
the doctrine of forum non conveniens and the doctrine of judgment
enforcement are at odds with each other, foreign plaintiffs end up empty
handed while allegedly liable domestic defendants receive a windfall.
This Note explores the problems presented by the modern application of
the doctrine of forum non conveniens in the transnational litigation
context and proposes a three-pronged, multifaceted approach to
addressing these problems to preserve the “interest of justice.”
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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine the following: a burglar comes into your home, ravages
your dwelling to find and take what he desires, and leaves your
home, not as he found it, but rather in shambles. Assume that you
can show that the burglar did this to your home. How do you feel?
Does your home feel like it did before? Do you want to hold the
burglar accountable for this violation?
Now imagine that this burglary does not just happen over the
course of one night. Instead, the burglar takes nearly twenty-six years
to go through your home and take what he wants. To this prolonged
invasion, add eighteen billion gallons of toxic waste left in
waterways; hundreds of abandoned, nonremediated waste pits, five
indigenous tribes’ traditional lifestyles decimated, one tribe
eradicated, and what do you have?1 A factual recitation aptly coined
the “Amazon Chernobyl.”2
This is precisely the situation that the modern application of the
doctrine of forum non conveniens (the “Doctrine”) has left countless
Ecuadorians facing at present.3 The Doctrine’s interaction with
another doctrine, the doctrine of judgment enforcement, threatens to
leave these foreign plaintiffs without “access to justice.”4 A brief
overview of the factual circumstances that have led to years of
litigation in both America and Ecuador will help to better explain
this threat and why our legal system should take affirmative steps to
alter it.

1. Ecuador Court Upholds $8.6 Billion Ruling Against Chevron, CNN (Jan. 4, 2012, 8:35
AM) [hereinafter CNN], http://www.cnn.com/2012/01/04/world/americas/ecuador-chevronlawsuit/index.html; AMAZON DEF. COAL., Understanding Chevron's "Amazon Chernobyl":
Detailed Background on Landmark Legal Case over Chevron's Environmental Contamination in
Ecuador 7 (2009), available at http://amazonwatch.org/documents/ecuador-press-kit/detailedbackground.pdf.
2. AMAZON DEF. COAL., supra note 1, at 4.
3. See Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470, 480 (2d Cir. 2002) (affirming the district
court’s decision to dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens provided Texaco agreed to waive
the statute of limitations); Patrick Radden Keefe, Why Chevron Will Settle in Ecuador, THE NEW
YORKER (Jan. 4, 2012), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2012/01/why-chevron
-will-settle-in-ecuador.html.
4. Christopher A. Whytock & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens and the
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1444, 1450 (2011).

296

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:293

In 1964, Texaco, Inc. began “oil exploration and drilling
activities” for crude oil in the Oriente region of eastern Ecuador.5
Over the next twenty-six years, Texaco constructed and developed
oil wells and pipelines and produced innumerable barrels of crude
oil.6 Allegedly, Texaco’s practices in the Oriente region were less
than “environmentally sound” and failed to meet both accepted
international standards and internal company guidelines.7 The
alleged lack of due care caused damage of “outrageous proportions”
to the people and environment.8 For example, residents of the
Oriente region alleged that Texaco failed to take adequate
precautions and remedial measures in their drilling operations such
that “streams, rivers, lakes, and aquifers of the Oriente ha[d] become
so contaminated with oil and oil by-products that the water [in the
region was] unsuitable for drinking.”9 In addition, these residents
claimed that nearly seventeen million gallons of oil spilled from
Texaco’s pipelines due to ruptures and leaks.10 These were just two
of the many environmental harms that Texaco allegedly caused.11
These circumstances gave rise to the 1993 complaint in Aguinda
v. Texaco, Inc.,12 which was filed in a federal district court for the
Southern District of New York.13 The Aguinda complaint alleged
that Texaco had caused plaintiffs to suffer “property damage,
personal injuries, increased risks of cancer and other diseases, and
ha[d] resulted in the degradation and destruction of the environment
in which plaintiffs and their families live[d],” all as a result of
Texaco’s “negligent, reckless, intentional and outrageous acts and
omissions . . . in connection with its oil exploration and drilling
operations [in the Oriente region].”14 In 2001, after an eight-year
5. Complaint at 22, Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (No. 93
Civ. 7527 JSR).
6. Id. at 22–23.
7. Id. at 23.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 26.
10. Id. at 24 (basing the spillage amount on Ecuadorian government estimates). This is six
million gallons more than the Exxon Valdez oil spill. Id. at 24–25; see also AMAZON DEF. COAL.,
supra note 1, at 4 (estimating the overall damage to be thirty times that of the Exxon Valdez
spill).
11. See Complaint, supra note 5, at 23–27.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 3–4.
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battle over whether Ecuador was truly an adequate alternative forum,
Aguinda succumbed to the Doctrine and Texaco secured the
dismissal it sought.15 Texaco, the proponent of the notion that
Ecuadorian courts were adequate, succeeded in arguing that the case
“ha[d] everything to do with Ecuador and nothing to do with the
United States.”16 As part of the 2001 dismissal, Texaco consented to
the jurisdiction of the Ecuadorian courts should the plaintiffs refile
the action there.17
The Aguinda plaintiffs persisted and refiled suit in an
Ecuadorian court in 2003.18 By this time, Chevron Corporation had
purchased Texaco, and it was now the defendant to the action,
having inherited both the good and the bad from Texaco.19 After
nearly ten more years of litigation, amid allegations of judicial
corruption20 and a related lawsuit against one of the plaintiffs’
attorneys under RICO,21 an Ecuadorian appellate court upheld an
$8.6 billion ruling against Chevron in early 2012.22
On the surface, this seems to have been a victory for the
plaintiffs. However, this was not the end of the battle. Because
Chevron has no assets in Ecuador, the plaintiffs will have to search
elsewhere to recover on the Ecuadorian judgment.23 Cue the doctrine
of judgment enforcement, which Chevron has vowed to take full

15. Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). The adequatealternative-forum showing is just one of the elements required to grant a forum non conveniens
dismissal. Id. at 538. Of note, this was Texaco’s second motion to dismiss for forum non
conveniens. Id.; see also Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153, 159 (2d Cir. 1998) (vacating the
district court’s judgment granting a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens because it did not
first secure a “commitment by Texaco to submit to the jurisdiction of the Ecuadoran courts for
purposes of this action”).
16. Aguinda, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 537 (quoting District Judge Rakoff on the renewed motion
to dismiss for forum non conveniens).
17. Id. at 538.
18. Whytock & Robertson, supra note 4, at 1447–48.
19. See Patrick Radden Keefe, Reversal of Fortune, NEW YORKER (Jan. 9, 2012),
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2012/01/09/120109fa_fact_keefe.
20. See id.
21. Complaint at 1–4, Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 2011 WL 979609 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1,
2011) (No. 11 Civ. 0691 LAK). RICO is the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act,
which was a part of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. See Organized Crime Control Act
of 1970, Pub L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 & 28
U.S.C.).
22. CNN, supra note 1 (explaining that if Chevron does not publicly apologize to Ecuador,
the judgment will be doubled).
23. Keefe, supra note 3.
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advantage of in protecting its American assets.24 In fact, Chevron
already attempted to do so by requesting an anti-enforcement
injunction from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York that would prevent enforcement of the
Ecuadorian judgment anywhere outside of Ecuador.25 Although the
district court granted this “extraordinary and unprecedented global
injunction,” the Second Circuit reversed the lower court’s judgment
and vacated the injunction.26
The “Amazon Chernobyl” is not the only example of the
unfortunate interaction between forum non conveniens and the
judgment-enforcement doctrines.27 Similar fates have befallen
plaintiffs who brought suit against defendant corporations like Dole
Food Company28 and Shell Oil Company29 for alleged injuries
caused by chemical exposures, only to have their foreign judgments
declared unenforceable.30 This roundtrip courtroom excursion, from
America to a foreign judiciary and back to America for judgment
enforcement, has led to the evocative expression “boomerang
litigation.”31
24. See Keefe, supra note 19 (stating that Chevron has likened due process in Ecuador “to
what one might find in North Korea”); Keefe, supra note 3 (“Chevron lawyers will . . . argue that
Ecuador is corrupt and that the judgment is fraudulent, and should not be enforced.”).
25. See Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232, 234 (2d Cir. 2012). Note that Chevron’s
argument for the injunction, in part, directly contradicted the argument that it made to support the
motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens that prompted the case to be filed in Ecuador.
Compare Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 581, 594 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Chevron
contends that the judgment is not enforceable outside of Ecuador because (1) the Ecuadorian legal
system does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of
due process of law . . . .”), with Brief for Appellee at 56, Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp.
2d 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“The most persuasive evidence that Ecuador can and does dispense
independent and impartial justice in these cases is the record of corruption-free litigation against
Texaco’s subsidiary and other companies.”).
26. See Naranjo, 667 F.3d at 234; Keefe, supra note 3.
27. See generally Whytock & Robertson, supra note 4, at 1447, 1474–81 (citing case
examples of the “access to justice” gap that occurs when the doctrines of forum non conveniens
and judgment enforcement collide).
28. Osorio v. Dole Food Co., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1352 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (“Because the
judgment was ‘rendered under a system which does not provide impartial tribunal[s] or
procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of law,’ . . . the judgment is not
considered conclusive, and cannot be enforced . . . .” (quoting FLA. STAT. § 55.605(1)(a)
(2009))). Dole is a Delaware corporation. Id. at 1311.
29. Shell Oil Co. v. Franco, 2005 WL 6184247, at *13 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2005) (granting
plaintiff Shell Oil Company’s motion for summary judgment and holding that the defendants’
Nicaraguan judgment was unenforceable).
30. Whytock & Robertson, supra note 4, at 1475–76, 1478, 1480.
31. Id. at 1451.
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Besides affecting the foreign plaintiffs who file suit in America,
the interaction between these two doctrines also extends to the
judiciary itself. At the heart of the doctrine of forum non conveniens
initially was the idea of justice—that jurisdiction may be declined “in
the interest of justice.”32 As is evident from the above discussion of
Aguinda and the multitude of court proceedings in that litigation, the
current application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens leaves
serious doubts about whether the “interest of justice” is being served.
The purpose of this Note is to explore the problems presented by
the modern application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens in
the transnational litigation context and to propose a multifaceted
approach to addressing these problems. Part II of this Note discusses
the historical development of the federal doctrine of forum non
conveniens, including its transition from a largely domestic doctrine
to its modern application in international matters. Part III focuses on
the potential judgment-enforcement obstacle that the modern federal
doctrine presents for foreign plaintiffs and this obstacle’s
implications on the “interest of justice.” Part IV proposes a scheme
for addressing this problem that employs various procedural
safeguards at multiple stages of the litigation.
II. THE FEDERAL DOCTRINE
OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS
A. The Doctrine Recognized:
A Formal Solution for Domestic Issues
Prior to the mid-twentieth century in America, the doctrine of
forum non conveniens was “rarely . . . referred to by name,” despite
its abundant application in American case law.33 Rising to
prominence in Scotland,34 and further developed in England,35 the
32. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 504 (1947) (“Courts of equity and of law also
occasionally decline, in the interest of justice, to exercise jurisdiction . . . where for kindred
reasons the litigation can more appropriately be conducted in a foreign tribunal.” (emphasis
added) (quoting Can. Malting Co. v. Paterson S.S., Ltd., 285 U.S. 413, 422–23 (1932)).
33. Paxton Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2 (1929); see also Robert Braucher, The Inconvenient Federal Forum, 60
HARV. L. REV. 908, 914, 918–21 (1947) (discussing various applications of the doctrine of forum
non conveniens in early American case law).
34. See Blair, supra note 33, at 20 n.91; Braucher, supra note 32, at 909–10; Joseph Dainow,
The Inappropriate Forum, 29 ILL. L. REV. 867, 881 & n.58 (1935).
35. See Blair, supra note 33, at 20–21.
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doctrine of forum non conveniens was created by foreign courts to
provide them the discretion to invoke it in order to serve “the proper
administration of justice.”36 Initially, this purpose arguably failed to
translate to American courts.37 However, a 1946 United States
Supreme Court holding38 solidified the notion that courts can use
their discretionary power to decline jurisdiction when appropriate.39
Accordingly, two seminal cases from the Court’s 1947 Term,
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert40 and Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual
Casualty Co.,41 brought the Doctrine to the forefront of the federal
judiciary and gave it two legs on which to stand.42 Both decisions
expounded on the practice as it existed at the time, solidified it
further, and provided federal courts with a recognized remedy for
litigant inconvenience in actions at law.43
1. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert44
In Gulf Oil Corp., the Court began its analysis of whether a
United States district court had the “inherent power to dismiss a suit
pursuant to the doctrine of forum non conveniens”45 with a simple
premise: “[T]he proposition that a court having jurisdiction must
36. See, e.g., Société du Gaz de Paris v. Société Anonyme de Navigation “Les Armateurs
Français,” [1926] Sess. Cas. (H.L.) 13 (Scot.); Logan v. Bank of Scotland, [1906] 1 K.B. 141 (C.
A. 1905). Although Société appears to suggest that the convenience of the parties was a central
focus of the doctrinal inquiry, the various criteria considered were merely to effectuate “the
proper administration of justice [by] fixing the appropriate forum for trial.” Dainow, supra note
34, at 881–82.
37. Braucher, supra note 33, at 912–13. But see Blair, supra note 33, at 1, 22.
38. See Williams v. Green Bay & W. R.R. Co., 326 U.S. 549 (1946). In Williams, the Court
aimed to put the Doctrine in “proper perspective” when it refused to dismiss the case based on the
difficulty of determining state law. Id. at 554; see Braucher, supra note 33, at 922.
39. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
40. 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
41. 330 U.S. 518 (1947).
42. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 248 n.13 (1981) (“The [forum non
conveniens] doctrine became firmly established when Gilbert and Koster were decided . . . .”);
14D CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3828.1 (3d ed.
2011) (“[The Gulf Oil Corp.] decision firmly entrenched the doctrine of forum non conveniens in
the federal courts.”).
43. See Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S. 501; Koster, 330 U.S. 518.
44. Plaintiff Gilbert, a Virginia resident, filed a tort claim in a New York federal district
court against defendant Gulf Oil Corporation, a Pennsylvania corporation doing business in
Virginia and New York, for events occurring in Virginia. Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S. at 502.
Defendant successfully invoked the doctrine of forum non conveniens, claiming the appropriate
place for trial was Virginia. Id. at 512.
45. Id. at 502.
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exercise it, is not universally true . . . .”46 In the “interest of justice,”
courts of equity and of law had declined to exercise jurisdiction
“where the suit [was] between aliens or non-residents or where for
kindred reasons the litigation [should] more appropriately be
conducted in a foreign tribunal.”47 The exercise of jurisdictional
discretion sparked debate about the extent of such a “power”—one
that was made evident in Justice Black’s vehement dissent to the 5–4
Gulf Oil Corp. decision.48 However, limiting a court’s power to
dismiss under forum non conveniens to courts with equitable
jurisdiction proved unsatisfactory after the “merger of law and equity
under the Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938.”49
The Gulf Oil Corp. decision resolved this debate by holding that
forum non conveniens could be used not only in courts of equity but
also in courts of law.50 The Court stated that while it had recognized
and approved the Doctrine’s name, it never had rejected the
Doctrine’s application to actions at law, an extension it viewed as
necessary.51 Writing the opinion for the Court, Justice Jackson
summarized the then-current state of the Doctrine for actions at law:
“The principle of forum non conveniens is simply that a court may
resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is
authorized by the letter of a general venue statute.”52 Unlike Justice
Black, the majority did not believe leaving such discretion to the
courts would “result in many abuses” at the hands of the judiciary.53
Recognizing the concern that federal courts would have to
exercise discretion in determining whether to grant a forum non
46. Id. at 504 (quoting Can. Malting Co. v. Paterson S.S., Ltd., 285 U.S. 413, 422 (1932)).
47. Id. (quoting Can. Malting Co., 285 U.S. at 423).
48. Id. at 513 (Black, J., dissenting) (“[T]his Court has never before held contrary to the
general principle that ‘the courts of the United States are bound to proceed to judgment, and to
afford redress to suitors before them, in every case to which their jurisdiction extends. They
cannot abdicate their authority or duty in any case in favor of another jurisdiction.’” (quoting
Chicot Cnty. v. Sherwood, 148 U.S. 529, 534 (1893))).
49. Braucher, supra note 33, at 925; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 2 (“There is one form of
action—the civil action.”).
50. See Braucher, supra note 33, at 927 (“The principle is simply that a court may resist
imposition on its jurisdiction.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
51. Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S. at 505 n.4.
52. Id. at 507.
53. Id. at 508. But see id. at 516 (Black, J., dissenting) (stating that “[t]he Court’s new rule
will thus clutter the very threshold of the federal courts with a preliminary trial of fact” and the
discretion given to the federal courts “will inevitably produce a complex of close and
indistinguishable decisions”).
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conveniens dismissal, the majority offered guidance for such
decisions by providing a list of factors to consider.54 The Court
suggested that by considering both a set of private factors55—those
interests affecting the litigant—and a set of factors concerning public
interest,56 a court could more readily make a determination regarding
dismissal.57 This balancing analysis allowed, and still allows, courts
to provide a remedy in the event that the plaintiff chose the forum
strictly to inconvenience the defendant.58 The Court noted, however,
that from the outset there is a strong presumption in favor of the
plaintiff’s choice of forum and that dismissal should not be granted
“unless the balance [of these factors] is strongly in favor of the
defendant.”59

54. Id. at 508–09.
55. Id. at 508 (“Important considerations are the relative ease of access to sources of proof;
availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining
attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to
the action; and all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and
inexpensive. There may also be questions as to the enforcibility [sic] of a judgment if one is
obtained.”).
56. Id. at 508–09 (“Factors of public interest also have place in applying the doctrine.
Administrative difficulties follow for courts when litigation is piled up in congested centers
instead of being handled at its origin. Jury duty is a burden that ought not to be imposed upon the
people of a community which has no relation to the litigation. In cases which touch the affairs of
many persons, there is reason for holding the trial in their view and reach rather than in remote
parts of the country where they can learn of it by report only. There is a local interest in having
localized controversies decided at home. There is an appropriateness, too, in having the trial of a
diversity case in a forum that is at home with the state law that must govern the case, rather than
having a court in some other forum untangle problems in conflict of laws, and in law foreign to
itself.”).
57. The full forum non conveniens analysis is a two-part process: the court (1) makes a
determination as to “whether there is an available and adequate alternative forum,” and (2)
balances the private and public factors “to determine whether the court should dismiss the
plaintiff’s suit in favor of that alternative forum.” Whytock & Robertson, supra note 4, at 1456. If
the proposed alternative forum is not both available and adequate, then the analysis stops there
and dismissal is denied. See id. “Overall, the alternative forum requirement does not appear to be
a significant barrier to defendants’ efforts to dismiss transnational litigation in favor of foreign
courts.” Id. at 1460.
58. Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S. at 508 (citing Blair, supra note 33). “It is often said that the
plaintiff may not, by choice of an inconvenient forum, ‘vex,’ ‘harass,’ or ‘oppress’ the defendant
by inflicting upon him expense or trouble not necessary to [the plaintiff’s] own right to pursue his
remedy.” Id.
59. See id.
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2. Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co.60
On the heels of Gulf Oil Corp. came Koster, another forum non
conveniens decision, this time involving multiple plaintiffs in the
“internal affairs” context.61 Like Gulf Oil Corp., Koster dispelled the
notion that a court that has jurisdiction is necessarily required to
exercise it.62 Building on the substantial evaluation of the Doctrine in
Gulf Oil Corp., Koster presented two more developments: multiple
plaintiffs with equal rights to the cause of action weakened any one
plaintiff’s choice of forum,63 and a trial involving issues relating to
the “internal affairs of a foreign corporation” did not require
dismissal.64
In expounding on the balancing analysis that courts should
perform, the Court indicated that a plaintiff should be given the
benefit of his choice of forum absent facts suggesting that the
plaintiff tried to deliberately inconvenience the defendant.65 The
Court modified this presumption, however, for actions involving
potentially hundreds of similarly situated plaintiffs.66 Under those
circumstances, as was the case in Koster, a plaintiff’s presumption of
an appropriate forum was “considerably weakened.”67 The Court
rationalized modifying the Doctrine on the premise that to adjudicate
such a matter brings with it more than the “ordinary task” of a trial;
among other things, it includes far greater administrative effort in
“relation to the whole group.”68

60. Plaintiff policyholder Koster, a New York resident, filed a derivative action on behalf of
all members and policyholders in a New York federal district court against defendant insurance
company Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company, a company with its principal place of business
in Illinois. Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 519 (1947) Defendant
successfully invoked the doctrine of forum non conveniens, claiming the appropriate place for
trial was Illinois. Id. at 520, 531–32.
61. Id. at 518–22. Here, “internal affairs” refers to the business dealings of the defendant
corporation. See id. at 536.
62. Id. at 520 n.1 (stating that previous holdings requiring exercise of jurisdiction “had
nothing to do with [Koster]” and that “[w]e are concerned here with the autonomous
administration of the federal courts in the discharge of their own judicial duties, subject of course
to the control of Congress.”).
63. Id. at 524.
64. Id. at 527.
65. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947).
66. Koster, 330 U.S. at 524.
67. Id.; see Braucher, supra note 32, at 923.
68. See Koster, 330 U.S. at 526.
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The Court’s opinion further strengthened federal courts’
discretionary power by steering away from the idea that forum non
conveniens in an “internal affairs” context required dismissal.69 The
Court stated in dicta that “[t]here is no rule of law . . . which requires
dismissal . . . on a mere showing that the trial will involve issues
which relate to the internal affairs of a foreign corporation.”70 The
Court supported this by affirming that the Doctrine “resists
formalization” and that the better inquiry was whether trial “best
serve[d] the convenience of the parties and the ends of justice,”
entitling a corporation’s location to “little consideration.”71 In so
stating, the Court gave itself more power to dictate when it will or
will not dismiss, making the Doctrine more malleable than it
previously was.72
B. A Whole New World:
From a Domestic Doctrine
to an International Doctrine
In the years after the Gulf Oil Corp. and Koster decisions, the
prototypical case in which the Doctrine was normally applied began
to involve an international dimension.73 As a result, the Court’s 1981
decision in Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno74 represented a fine-tuning of
the forum non conveniens analysis, focusing the Doctrine more on
foreign plaintiffs filing suit in American courts against American
defendants.75 Then, in 2007, the Court decided Sinochem

69. Id. at 527.
70. Id. “Foreign corporations” at this time and in this context refers to corporations with
their principal place of business or “domicile” outside of the forum state. See id. at 526.
71. Id. at 527–28.
72. Id. at 526. It is noteworthy that the Court took this opportunity to “clarify” its power to
dismiss an action. Although it dismissed this case under forum non conveniens, it did so entirely
based on the balancing analysis described in Gulf Oil Corp. See id. at 535–36.
73. See Megan Waples, The Adequate Alternative Forum Analysis in Forum Non
Conveniens: A Case for Reform, 36 CONN. L. REV. 1475, 1475 (2004) (stating that the doctrine
“primarily applies in situations involving an international dimension”); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a) (2011) (allowing district courts to transfer civil actions to another district court in the
interest of justice).
74. 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
75. David Boyce, Foreign Plaintiffs and Forum Non Conveniens, 64 TEX. L. REV. 193, 195
(1985) (stating that Piper Aircraft Co. “focuses on the ‘private interests’ of the litigants”); see
also Waples, supra note 73, at 1475 ( “[T]he [Piper Aircraft Co.] Court gave the doctrine a much
stronger focus on preventing forum shopping by foreign plaintiffs.”). See generally 14D WRIGHT
ET AL., supra note 42, § 3828 (“[T]the forum non conveniens principle has become unnecessary
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International Co. v. Malaysia International Shipping Corp.,76 a case
involving the issue of whether jurisdiction must be conclusively
established prior to a forum non conveniens dismissal.77 Both of
these cases have had a direct impact on the number of forum non
conveniens cases courts hear and the circumstances under which they
can be decided.78
1. Change of Venue, Change of Doctrine
The Doctrine was quickly altered after being recognized by the
Supreme Court in 1947. In 1948, Congress adopted § 1404(a) of
Title 28.79 This federal transfer statute governs transfer among
federal district courts “in the furtherance of justice.”80 However, it
alleviated the need for the Doctrine as a means of dismissing
domestic matters to other more appropriate forums.81 As a result of
§ 1404(a), forum non conveniens faded from the judicial scene and
became “only appropriate when the more convenient forum is a
foreign country.”82 Thirty-three years passed before the Supreme
Court issued another significant opinion on the Doctrine.83

in most circumstances [and] it is only appropriate when the more convenient forum is in a foreign
country.”).
76. 549 U.S. 422 (2007).
77. Id. at 425.
78. See Finity E. Jernigan, Forum Non Conveniens: Whose Convenience and Justice?, 86
TEX. L. REV. 1079, 1088–89 (2008).
79. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2011).
80. Robert P. Hobson, Forum Non Conveniens Under the United States Judicial Code, 8
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 29, 34 (1951).
81. See 14D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 42, § 3828 (“The addition of Section 1404(a) to the
Judicial Code in 1948, which allows courts to transfer a case under certain circumstances to
another federal court that is more convenient, limited the need for a forum non conveniens
dismissal.”).
82. Id.
83. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
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2. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno84
After Koster was decided in 1947 and § 1404(a) was adopted in
1948, the next Supreme Court case regarding the Doctrine to garner
considerable attention was Piper Aircraft Co.85 There the Court held
that a plaintiff may not defeat a forum non conveniens dismissal
merely by demonstrating that the substantive law of the alternate
forum is less favorable.86 This has led to the Doctrine becoming an
“automatic defense response to transnational liability actions” and a
“formidable obstacle [for] foreign plaintiffs.”87
Unlike its predecessor, Gulf Oil Corp., Piper Aircraft Co. found
the Court focusing on the first part of the forum non conveniens
analysis—the adequate-alternative-forum inquiry.88 In Piper Aircraft
Co., the Court stated that “[t]he doctrine of forum non conveniens . . .
[was] designed in part to help courts avoid conducting complex
exercises in comparative law”89 and reasoned that “if the possibility
of an unfavorable change in substantive law [was] given substantial
weight in the . . . inquiry, dismissal would rarely be proper.”90
Although the Court indicated that judges could consider an
unfavorable change in substantive law,91 it clarified that the correct
measure for an inadequate alternative forum was whether “the

84. Id. Plaintiff Reyno, a California court-appointed representative for Scottish decedents of
an aircraft crash, filed separate wrongful-death suits in a California state court against defendants
Piper Aircraft Company, a Pennsylvania company, and Hartzell Propeller, Inc., an Ohio
corporation, for manufacturing the aircraft and its propellers, respectively. Id. at 238–40.
Defendants first successfully motioned for removal to the United States District Court for the
Central District of California. Id. at 240. Piper then successfully moved to transfer to the Middle
District of Pennsylvania and Hartzell had its service quashed, but was amenable to process in
Pennsylvania. Id. at 240–41. Defendants then successfully invoked the doctrine of forum non
conveniens, claiming the appropriate place for trial was Scotland. Id. at 238.
85. Id. at 235.
86. Id. at 247; see Jernigan, supra note 78, at 1090–91.
87. Paula C. Johnson, Regulation, Remedy, and Exported Tobacco Products: The Need for a
Response from the United States Government, 25 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 52 (1991).
88. Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 254 n.22 (“At the outset of any forum non conveniens
inquiry, the court must determine whether there exists an alternative forum.”); Jernigan, supra
note 78, at 1091. The forum non conveniens “test” involves two separate inquiries: (1) whether an
alternate forum exists and (2) a balancing of private and public interests (the Gulf Oil Corp.
factors; see supra Part II.A.1). See 14D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 42, §§ 3828, 3828.3, 3828.4.
Furthermore, the alternate-forum inquiry involves two separate requirements: (1) the availability
of an alternative forum and (2) the adequacy of the alternative forum. Id. § 3828.3.
89. Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 251.
90. Id. at 250.
91. Id. at 254.
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remedy offered by the other forum [was] clearly unsatisfactory,”
such that “it [was] no remedy at all.”92 Moreover, the Court upheld
the district court’s holding that the presumption favoring plaintiff’s
choice of forum applied with “less force” when the plaintiff was
foreign.93
These distinctions have had an important impact on the Gulf Oil
Corp. Court’s assertion that the plaintiff’s choice of forum “should
rarely be disturbed,” since they expanded the exceptions to the
choice-of-forum presumption.94 There has been growing concern that
the Court did not consider forums with “less developed legal
systems” when deciding Piper Aircraft Co., suggesting that these
exceptions should be limited.95 Legal scholars have noted that
because the Court has not fully described what constitutes an
adequate forum since Piper Aircraft Co., foreign plaintiffs from
places with less developed legal systems frequently face dismissals
despite showing that the alternate forum is, in essence, inadequate.96
As a result, these foreign plaintiffs have suffered because of an
adequacy standard that some consider to be too “easily satisfied.”97
3. Sinochem International Co. v.
Malaysia International Shipping Corp.98
The Court further expanded the Doctrine when it decided that
under specific conditions, a court need not have jurisdiction to order
a forum non conveniens dismissal.99 Relying heavily on precedent,100
92. Id. at 254 & n.22 (indicating that the initial requirement of the forum non conveniens
“test” would not be satisfied and dismissal would be improper).
93. Id. at 255 (referencing the presumption established in Gulf Oil Corp. that plaintiff’s
choice of forum “should rarely be disturbed” (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501,
508 (1947))).
94. Jernigan, supra note 78, at 1089–91.
95. See id. at 1092.
96. Waples, supra note 73, at 1476 (stating inadequacy arguments such as “procedural
deficiencies and barriers, lack of resources and corruption and other political problems”); see also
Whytock & Robertson, supra note 4, at 1457 (arguing that such adverse conditions render the
foreign forum “inadequate” for forum non conveniens dismissals).
97. Whytock & Robertson, supra note 4, at 1457.
98. Plaintiff Malaysia International Shipping Company filed a negligent misrepresentation
suit in a Pennsylvania federal district court against defendant Sinochem International Company,
Limited. Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 427 (2007). Defendant
successfully invoked the doctrine of forum non conveniens, claiming the appropriate place for
trial was China, without the court first determining whether or not it had jurisdiction over the
matter. Id. at 425, 428–29.
99. See id. at 435–36.
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the Sinochem Court held that if a court’s jurisdictional analysis is
“difficult to determine” and the forum non conveniens analysis
weighs “heavily in favor of dismissal,” then the court may dismiss
without conducting the jurisdictional analysis.101 The Court reasoned
that a trial court could bypass the standard issues of personal and
subject-matter jurisdiction when “considerations of convenience,
fairness, and judicial economy so warrant.”102 The Sinochem
holding, however, left unanswered the question of whether a court
“conditioning a forum non conveniens dismissal on the waiver of
jurisdictional or limitations defenses in [a] foreign forum must first
determine its own authority to adjudicate the case.”103 The
considerations the Court enumerated that warranted a forum non
conveniens dismissal, combined with what the Court’s holding left
unanswered, will have a considerable impact on foreign plaintiffs
who choose an American forum.104 Consequently, in the relatively
short time since the Sinochem decision, federal courts are already
applying Sinochem’s tenets in order to dismiss cases in the
transnational litigation context with some degree of frequency.105

100. See Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 453 (1994) (“[T]he doctrine of forum
non conveniens is nothing more or less than a supervening venue provision, permitting
displacement of the ordinary rules of venue when, in light of certain conditions, the trial court
thinks that jurisdiction ought to be declined.”).
101. Sinochem Int’l Co., 549 U.S. at 436. The Court reasoned that if the forum non
conveniens analysis is going to result in a dismissal anyway, then a court can properly take the
“less burdensome” route so that the merits of the case may be determined elsewhere. Id.; see also
Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (“Without jurisdiction the court
cannot proceed at all in any cause; it may not assume jurisdiction for the purpose of deciding the
merits of the case.” (quoting Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 514 (1868)) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
102. Sinochem Int’l Co., 549 U.S. at 432.
103. Id. at 435; 14D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 42, § 3828.
104. Foreign plaintiffs filing suit against American defendants in American courts for
transnational claims often find that defendants move for dismissal under forum non conveniens
and agree to waive any jurisdictional or limitations defenses in the foreign forum (i.e., a
conditional dismissal). See Whytock & Robertson, supra note 4, at 1456–57 (“Defendants
routinely satisfy [the available-alternative-forum] requirement by consenting to the jurisdiction of
the alternative forum as part of the forum non conveniens motion.”). Dismissals seem primed to
be granted given the frequent end run around the available-alternative-forum requirement by
defendants; the low bar for the adequate-alternative-forum requirement, and the courts’
willingness to consider convenience, fairness, and judicial economy before determining whether
it has jurisdiction over the matter.
105. See Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving Forum Shopping System, 96 CORNELL L.
REV. 481, 502, 503 & n.116, 504 (2011) (citing a 62 percent dismissal rate in transnational claims
on forum non conveniens grounds since 2007).
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The foregoing discussion illustrates how the Doctrine has
strayed from its original purpose as a means of “proper
administration of justice” to a standard that does not even require the
court to have jurisdiction over the matter before dismissing it.106
III. GLOBALIZATION OF THE ECONOMY,
GLOBALIZATION OF HARMS:
THE MODERN PROBLEM OF AN
OUTDATED DOCTRINE OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS
As it is currently applied, the Doctrine leaves wide open the
possibility of a litigation/enforcement nightmare for foreign plaintiffs
and a potential windfall for allegedly liable domestic defendants.107
Specifically, the problem arises when the Doctrine interacts with the
doctrine of judgment enforcement.108 If plaintiffs are able to secure a
foreign court’s judgment against defendants,109 and defendants have
no assets located in that same foreign country, plaintiffs are left to
enforce the foreign judgment elsewhere—usually in the United
States.110 Because the doctrine of judgment enforcement weighs
criteria separately from and differently than the doctrine of forum
non conveniens,111 plaintiffs with a foreign-based judgment can
effectively “be denied meaningful access to justice.”112 This denial of
106. See supra Part II.
107. See Christina Weston, Comment, The Enforcement Loophole: Judgment-Recognition
Defenses as a Loophole to Corporate Accountability for Conduct Abroad, 25 EMORY INT’L L.
REV. 731, 750 (2011) (“If the corporation is successful in having the suit dismissed under [forum
non conveniens], the corporation is dealt a lucky hand of cards . . . .”).
108. See Whytock & Robertson, supra note 4, at 1450.
109. Recent trends suggest, particularly in Latin American countries, that the likelihood of
plaintiffs securing foreign-based judgments against American defendant-corporations is on the
rise. See id. at 1447; see also M. Ryan Casey & Barrett Ristroph, Boomerang Litigation: How
Convenient Is Forum Non Conveniens in Transnational Litigation?, 4 BYU INT’L L. & MGMT.
REV. 21, 21 (2007) (“Latin American countries are establishing regimes that are unreceptive to
the influence of American multinational corporations.”). This trend has led to the phrase “forum
shopper’s remorse” to describe defendants who were granted dismissals based on forum non
conveniens only to have a judgment entered against them abroad. Whytock & Robertson, supra
note 4, at 1447.
110. See Whytock & Robertson, supra note 4, at 1450; see also Casey & Ristroph, supra note
109, at 51 (“As plaintiffs achieve victories in Latin American courts, more judgment enforcement
cases are likely to find their way to U.S. courts.”). Note that in the cases mentioned in Part II, the
foreign plaintiffs presumably began their lawsuits in the United States because defendants
controlled no assets in the foreign country from which the plaintiff could easily recover any
foreign judgment. See supra Part II.
111. See infra Part III.A.
112. Whytock & Robertson, supra note 4, at 1450.
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meaningful access runs contrary to a core tenant of the Doctrine—
that “forum non conveniens [be] construed as an ‘instrument of
justice.’”113 The next section discusses the Doctrine’s interaction
with the doctrine of judgment enforcement, while the following
section briefly reintroduces the idea of protecting “the interest of
justice” and examines the Doctrine’s implications on issues of
comity and foreign relations.
A. The Doctrine of Judgment Enforcement’s
Interaction with Forum Non Conveniens
The doctrine of forum non conveniens, as it is currently applied,
does not take into account potential foreign-based judgmentenforcement issues.114 And it is no wonder that it does not—
judgment enforcement was not the focus when the doctrine was
formally adopted in the mid-1940s to address venue concerns for
domestic disputes.115 But with the implementation of § 1404(a) to
handle those situations and the marked increase in the globalization
of the economy and international interaction,116 what remains is an
interaction of these two doctrines that has become a sticking point
for foreign plaintiffs.117
On the surface, enforcing a foreign judgment does not seem to
be problematic. In this regard, thirty-two states have adopted the
Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act (UFMJRA) in
some form.118 The UFMJRA makes foreign judgments enforceable
in a signatory state, similar to how judgments of sister states are
“entitled to full faith and credit.”119 The rationale behind such a
113. Helen E. Mardirosian, Developments in the Law: Federal Jurisdiction and Forum
Selection, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1643, 1645 (2004) (quoting Williams v. Green Bay & W. R.R.
Co., 326 U.S. 549, 554 (1946)).
114. See generally Whytock & Robertson, supra note 4, at 1462 (discussing that forum non
conveniens analysis occurs at the beginning of transnational litigation, while judgment
enforcement occurs at the end of the litigation process).
115. See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 502 (1947); Koster v. Lumbermens
Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 519 (1947).
116. 14D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 42, § 3828; Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdictional Conflict
and Jurisdictional Equilibration: Paths to a Via Media?, 26 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 385, 395 & n.30
(2004) (“[F]orum non conveniens quickly became relevant in federal litigation only in cases
where the alternative forum was outside of the United States.”).
117. See Weston, supra note 107, at 735.
118. See id. at 738–39.
119. UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT §§ 2–3, 13, pt. II U.L.A. 46, 49
(2002) (stating that “any foreign judgment that is final and conclusive and enforceable where
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move is that if the United States is willing to recognize foreign
judgments, foreign countries will reciprocate and recognize
American judgments.120
However, the UFMJRA also provides reasons to not recognize a
foreign judgment.121 Section 4 of the UFMJRA provides two types of
grounds for nonrecognition: discretionary and mandatory.122
Discretionary grounds for nonrecognition include insufficient notice,
judgment obtained by fraud, public policy concerns, and conflicting
judgments.123 The mandatory grounds include the foreign court’s
lack of personal or subject-matter jurisdiction.124 Additionally, if the
judgment was “rendered under a system which does not provide
impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of
due process of law,” then this is mandatory grounds for
nonrecognition.125 Although any of the provisions listed under § 4 of
the UFMJRA may be cause for concern for a plaintiff, the
impartiality and due-process nonrecognition provisions are where the
doctrine of judgment enforcement collides with the doctrine of forum
non conveniens most fiercely.126
As mandatory grounds for nonrecognition, the impartiality and
due-process provisions of the UFMJRA require courts to evaluate
the adequacy of the foreign forum.127 This entails inquiring into the
fairness and impartiality of the foreign judiciary for a defendant, not
a plaintiff.128 On the other hand, “federal courts appear loathe to look
too closely at the character or the quality of justice in the proposed
rendered” is “enforceable in the same manner as the judgment of a sister state which is entitled to
full faith and credit”).
120. See Weston, supra note 107, at 739.
121. See UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4, 13, pt. II U.L.A. 58–59
(2002).
122. See id.
123. See id. § 4(b)(1)–(6).
124. Id. § 4(a)(2)–(3).
125. Id. § 4(a)(1). Recall the grounds on which the judgment in Osorio v. Dole Food Co. was
denied. See supra note 28.
126. See Whytock & Robertson, supra note 4, at 1469–71 (stating that the UFMJRA requires
U.S. courts to “evaluate the adequacy of foreign legal systems”).
127. Id. at 1469; see Weston, supra note 107, at 742–43.
128. See Whytock & Robertson, supra note 4, at 1470–71; see also Osorio v. Dole Food Co.,
No. 0722693-CIV, 2009 WL 48189, at *15 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 5, 2009) (noting that the question in a
judgment enforcement inquiry is whether the “judicial system is fair and impartial to the . . .
[d]efendants, not whether [the foreign forum] would provide the [p]laintiffs with an adequate
alternative forum”).
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alternative forum or the competence of its judicial personnel” for the
benefit of the plaintiff when performing the adequate-alternativeforum analysis in a forum non conveniens determination.129
Underscoring this is American courts’ reluctance to find the
proposed alternative forum inadequate based on “general accusations
of corruption, delay, or other problems with the alternative forum’s
judicial system.”130 As a result, the bar for determining alternateforum adequacy in a forum non conveniens analysis is “quite low”—
it will be adequate “as long as the plaintiff will not be deprived of all
remedies or subjected to unfair treatment.”131
Thus, the two doctrines are at odds with each other: forum non
conveniens’s adequacy analysis does not look at the quality of the
alternative forum, while the doctrine of judgment enforcement
requires the courts to inquire about the foreign judiciary’s “fairness,
impartiality, corruption, and other qualities.”132 Because of the
discrepancies in the standards used to evaluate the alternative forum
at these two discrete points in the litigation, the defendant’s
seemingly incompatible arguments—one to dismiss for forum non
conveniens to an adequate alternate forum, the other to find a foreign
judgment from that alternative forum unenforceable—can be
completely consistent.133 The defendant is therefore able to take
advantage of an “enforcement loophole” to escape being held
accountable for harm it was adjudged to have committed.134
B. The Intersection Between
a Forum Non Conveniens Dismissal
and the Judiciary: The “Interest of Justice,”
Comity, and Foreign Relations
Although judges and scholars have made many statements over
the years about the purpose of the doctrine of forum non
conveniens,135 the Doctrine is perhaps best understood as a means to

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

14D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 42, § 3828.3.
Id.
Id.
Whytock & Robertson, supra note 4, at 1470.
See id. at 1449–50.
See Weston, supra note 107, at 735.
See Whytock & Robertson, supra note 4, at 1454–56.
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“promote the ends of justice.”136 This is how it was understood in
Scotland and England in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries.137 This is how it was understood in America when it was
adopted by the Gulf Oil Corp. Court.138
When a court dismisses a transnational case to a foreign forum
under the Doctrine, it is deciding that the plaintiff should be denied
access to the U.S. judiciary on that action.139 This, in and of itself, is
not problematic and does not run afoul of the “interest of justice”
notion. But when a plaintiff whose action is dismissed under the
Doctrine is then denied recovery of a foreign judgment on the merits
of the claim, it is difficult to believe such a conundrum comports
with the Doctrine’s intent of promoting the ends of justice.140
The intersection of forum non conveniens and the doctrine of
judgment enforcement also implicates larger, more political
concerns—those of comity and foreign relations.141 For example,
“blocking statutes” have begun to sprout up in Latin American
countries in response to forum non conveniens dismissals of actions
brought by their citizens.142 Although a full discussion of these issues
is outside the purview of this Note,143 suffice it to say that comity
and foreign relations are important interests that would also benefit

136. Id. at 1455; see, e.g., Can. Malting Co., v. Paterson S.S., Ltd., 285 U.S. 413, 423 (1932)
(“Courts of equity and of law . . . occasionally decline, in the interest of justice, to exercise
jurisdiction . . . .”).
137. See supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
139. Whytock & Robertson, supra note 4, at 1454.
140. Besides the obvious hardship this places on the plaintiff trying to recover for harms
inflicted on him or her, it also leads to judicial inefficiency. See, e.g., Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo,
667 F.3d 232, 234 n.1 (2d Cir. 2012) (“An underinclusive Westlaw search for Chevron or Texaco
& Ecuador & ‘Lago Agrio’ yields fifty-six results, all of which deal directly with this litigation.”).
Such judicial inefficiency can hardly be said to “promote the ends of justice.”
141. Comity refers to the “recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the
legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international
duty and convenience.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 304 (9th ed. 2009).
142. See Casey & Ristroph, supra note 109, at 26–40.
143. For discussions on the issues of comity and foreign relations, see Cassandra Burke
Robertson, Transnational Litigation and Institutional Choice, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1081 (2010);
Casey & Ristroph, supra note 109; Virginia A. Fitt, The Tragedy of Comity: Questioning the
American Treatment of Inadequate Foreign Courts, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 1021 (2010); Jernigan,
supra note 78.
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from restructuring the interaction of the forum non conveniens and
judgment-enforcement doctrines.144
The foregoing suggests that reform measures are needed to bring
the Doctrine into modern times and make it workable in our
increasingly globalized world in which American corporations
frequently look to, and use, foreign markets to support their business
affairs.145 With this as a fact of the times we live in, it stands to
reason that more foreign plaintiffs will file suit against these
American corporations to redress any harms that befall them while
our corporations conduct business in their countries.146 The next Part
will venture to address the “access to justice” gap that can occur in
transnational-litigation cases in a manner that preserves the
Doctrine’s original focus—the “interest of justice.”147
IV. A MULTIFACETED SCHEME:
IMPARTIAL EVALUATION OF THE FOREIGN FORUM,
STAYING THE ACTION, AND MONITORING THE FOREIGN PROCEEDING
Many legal scholars and law school students have considered
the interaction between the doctrine of forum non conveniens and the
doctrine of judgment enforcement.148 Some have suggested
aggressive dismissal conditions, or stipulations, as a way to avoid
“boomerang litigation.”149 However, even if the parties meet any
144. Briefly put by Justice Doggett of the Supreme Court of Texas, “[C]omity requires U.S.
courts to hold U.S. companies accountable for torts committed abroad[,]” and this is “‘best
achieved by avoiding the possibility of incurring the wrath and distrust of the Third World’”—in
other words, by not “dismissing these cases.” Casey & Ristroph, supra note 109, at 43 (quoting
Dow Chem. Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 687 (Tex. 1990)).
145. See Dante Figueroa, Are There Ways Out of the Current Forum Non Conveniens
Impasse Between the United States and Latin America?, 1 BUS. L. BRIEF 42, 42 (2005)
(describing the effects of globalization).
146. See Whytock, supra note 105, at 490–91. However, not everyone considers an increase
in transnational litigation to be a foregone conclusion. Id. at 533 (suggesting that transnational
litigation is not yet at a point that it is “likely to have a net negative effect on foreign relations or
economic welfare”).
147. Whytock & Robertson, supra note 4, at 1450.
148. See, e.g., Cortelyou Kenney, Disaster in the Amazon: Dodging “Boomerang Suits” in
Transnational Human Rights Litigation, 97 CAL. L. REV. 857 (2009); Weston, supra note 107;
Whytock & Robertson, supra note 4.
149. See, e.g., Kenney, supra note 148, at 865–66 (suggesting aggressive dismissal
stipulations as a way to solve the interaction between the two doctrines without having to change
either doctrine as it is currently applied). Kenney also discusses the idea of “return clauses”—
dismissal conditions that permit the district court to resume jurisdiction if a catastrophic event
occurs in the foreign forum (like civil war)—as a way to “provide backstops against faulty
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dismissal conditions, it is still possible that foreign judgments may
not be recognized in a judgment-enforcement proceeding. Others
have proposed changes of judicial estoppel or conditional consent to
enforcement, which would place the risk of changes in the foreign
forum’s judicial adequacy on the defendant.150 Still others have
suggested excluding at enforcement proceedings the relitigation of
issues considered during the forum non conveniens stage.151 All of
these suggestions have one thing in common—the original suit
before the district court has been dismissed.
In contrast, this Note suggests a scheme for handling motions to
dismiss for forum non conveniens in the transnational-litigation
context that does not include dismissing the original action should an
alternate forum be the more appropriate location for litigating the
matter. By employing safeguards from the moment a motion is
filed,152 through a motion’s determination,153 and after a motion is
granted,154 the court can protect the “interest of justice” in
transnational-litigation matters.
This Note suggests a three-pronged system of safeguarding the
“interest of justice” that (1) incorporates the use of a master to
evaluate the proposed alternate forum; (2) requires courts to stay the
action rather than dismiss it; and (3) has the master conduct
postmotion functions, such as the investigation and enforcement of
decrees, in cases where there have been successful forum non
conveniens motions. The ultimate goal of this approach is that if the
district court finds reason to reinstate the original proceeding at any
time during the foreign proceeding, it may do so to protect the
“interest of justice.”

process.” Id. at 902. However, these provisions can be controversial, and it is unclear whether
they comport with Supreme Court precedent on the Doctrine. See id. at 902 & n.214.
150. See Whytock & Robertson, supra note 4, at 1500–09. A judicial-estoppel solution
requires “applying similar adequacy standards” under both doctrines—a solution that would
require changing one, or both, doctrines. Id. at 1502. The other solutions noted in the text still
allow for nonrecognition at the judgment-enforcement stage should the due-process or
impartiality requirements of the UFMJRA not be met. Id. at 1508–09.
151. See, e.g., Weston, supra note 107, at 762 (noting the theory of claim preclusion, or res
judicata).
152. See infra Part IV.A.
153. See infra Part IV.B.
154. See infra Part IV.C.
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A. First Prong: Appointing a Master to
Impartially Evaluate the Foreign Forum
Historically, trial courts have relied solely on parties’ briefs and
declarations when considering a motion to dismiss for forum non
conveniens.155 However, this does not provide the court with an
unbiased perspective on the proposed alternative forum given the
adversarial nature of our judicial system.156 Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure (FRCP) 53 provides a vehicle by which district courts can
achieve this unbiased perspective—a master.157 A court appoints a
master to perform duties it outlines—largely those having to do with
pre- and posttrial matters, although not exclusively so—when it
needs particular assistance.158
Masters have been used in federal courts since the beginning of
the nation, and their powers and duties have been confirmed by
judicial precedent.159 FRCP 53 authorizes masters to be appointed by
a district judge160 to “address pretrial and posttrial matters that
cannot be effectively and timely addressed by an available district
judge or magistrate judge of the district.”161 Such matters can
include, but are not limited to, “the determination of foreign law,”
“discovery related matters that under normal circumstances could be
addressed by a judge,” and posttrial enforcement of judgments or

155. See, e.g., Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp. Berhad v. Sinochem Int’l Co., No. Civ.A. 03-3771,
2004 WL 503541 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 27, 2004) (citing parties’ briefs in the Memorandum and Order
granting Sinochem’s motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens).
156. The Author recognizes that there can be no truly unbiased perspective, even when it
comes from a nonparty to the litigation who presents “all” sides of an issue, simply because any
person’s background and experiences will shape how he or she understands and conveys
information.
157. See FED. R. CIV. P. 53.
158. 9C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 42, § 2601. For a thorough exegesis on the history of the
master in the American legal landscape, see Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition:
Equity Procedure, Due Process, and the Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90
CORNELL L. REV. 1181 (2005).
159. 9C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 42, § 2601; see, e.g., In re Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 310–
14 (1920) (using the term “auditor” instead of master).
160. See Satyam Computer Servs., Ltd. v. Venture Global Eng’g, LLC, 323 F. App’x 421,
430–31 (6th Cir. 2009) (deciding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by appointing a
special master with knowledge of Indian law or adopting the special master’s findings); Hofmann
v. EMI Resorts, Inc., 689 F. Supp. 2d 1361, 1365 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (appointing a special master in
order to “sort all of [the evidence] out”). The district court may act on its own motion to appoint a
master. 9C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 42, § 2603.
161. FED. R. CIV. P. 53(a)(1)(C).
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decrees and investigations.162 Typically, a master “conducts himself
or herself as would a district or magistrate judge.”163 A master’s
powers over a particular matter can be wide-ranging and include
regulating all proceedings, compelling and taking evidence, and
imposing sanctions against noncompliant parties.164 In sum, a master
may “take all measures necessary or proper for the efficient
performance of the duties assigned to him or her.”165
Although FRCP 53 places some limits on the scope of why a
master may be appointed,166 a district court’s discretion in appointing
masters is broad.167 For example, masters have been appointed for
their technical expertise in patent law,168 special knowledge of
foreign law,169 and expertise in ERISA law.170 Masters have also
been appointed to monitor, investigate, and enforce judgments,171 as
well as supervise compliance with stipulations.172
Appointing a master to conduct an evaluation of a proposed
foreign forum seems to fall within what has traditionally been
approved by courts.173 Forum non conveniens calls upon the court to
make determinations regarding the adequacy of a foreign forum, in
addition to weighing a set of factors that may include “questions as
to the enforcibility [sic] of a judgment if one is obtained.”174 The
“enforceability” factor is one that may be more appropriately
handled by a master with special knowledge of the foreign forum and

162. 9C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 42, §§ 2602–02.1.
163. Id. § 2602.2.
164. FED. R. CIV. P. 53(c) (“Unless the appointing order directs otherwise . . . .”).
165. 9C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 42, § 2609.
166. See FED. R. CIV. P. 53(a)(1).
167. 9C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 42, § 2602.1 (“[J]udicial discretion and flexibility of use
remain the hallmarks of practice under [FRCP] 53.”).
168. See Smart Parts, Inc. v. WDP Ltd., No. 02-1557-KI, 2005 WL 35834, at *3 (D. Or.
Jan. 7, 2005).
169. See Satyam Computer Servs., Ltd. v. Venture Global Eng’g, LLC, 323 F. App’x 421,
430–31 (6th Cir. 2009).
170. See Hatteberg v. Red Adair Co., Emps. Profit Sharing Plan & Its Related Trust, 79 F.
App’x 709, 719–20 (5th Cir. 2003) (approving the appointment of two special masters due to the
“difficulty of the ERISA issues in the case”).
171. See Sukumar v. Direct Focus, Inc., 349 F. App’x 163, 164–65 (9th Cir. 2009).
172. See G.G. Marck & Assocs., Inc. v. Peng, No. 3:05 CV 7391, 2006 WL 1793252, at *3
(N.D. Ohio June 27, 2006).
173. See supra notes 158–165 and accompanying text.
174. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 506–08 (1947); see also supra notes 55–56
(listing the private and public factors to be considered).
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foreign law, as district court judges are generalists175 and not experts
on foreign judiciaries.176 By appointing a master to further delve into
the adequacy of the alternate forum and any enforceability concerns,
district court judges can make a more informed decision regarding a
motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens and the likelihood of
future judgment-enforcement issues should the motion be granted.
The more searching inquiry that a master would be able to provide in
forum non conveniens analysis would go a long way toward meeting
the Doctrine’s original goal of serving the “interest of justice.”177
Appointing a master also brings up the question of
compensation, but FRCP 53 accounts for that reality.178 The court
may proportionally assign the master’s compensation to one or more
parties based on the degree to which each party is responsible “for
the reference to [the] master.”179 The amount to be provided to the
master “should be liberal, but not exorbitant” in order to “adequately
remunerate[]” the master for “execut[ing the court’s] decrees
thoroughly, accurately, impartially, and in full response to the
confidence extended.”180
The question is then which party or parties pay for the master.
The most logical conclusion is the movant in the motion to dismiss
for forum non conveniens (in all likelihood, the defendant). This will
normally be the party “more responsible . . . for the reference to [the]
master.”181 And this makes sense because the plaintiff is the one who

175. See generally Diane P. Wood, Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
Generalist Judges in a Specialized World, Speech at the Eighth Annual Judge Irving L. Goldberg
Lecture Series, (Feb. 11, 1997), in 50 SMU L. REV. 1755, 1756–59, 1766 (1997) (characterizing
federal district court judges as generalists).
176. See 13 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 42, § 3508 (outlining the specialized courts created
by Congress).
177. Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S. at 504 (quoting Can. Malting Co. v. Paterson S.S., 285 U.S.
413, 422–23 (1932)).
178. See FED. R. CIV. P. 53(g).
179. FED. R. CIV. P. 53(g)(2)–(3); see also Holden v. S.S. Kendall Fish, 395 F.2d 910, 913
(5th Cir. 1968) (affirming the assessment of the master’s fee against the appellants); Heiberg v.
Hasler, 1 F.R.D. 735, 737 (E.D.N.Y. 1941) (taking into account the parties’ financial situations
when deciding to apportion the master’s fees to the more affluent defendant as opposed to the
plaintiff).
180. Newton v. Consol. Gas Co., 259 U.S. 101, 105 (1922).
181. FED. R. CIV. P. 53(g)(3).
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chose the district court as his or her preferred forum and the
defendant-movant is the one asking to go elsewhere.182
It follows from the discussion of FRCP 53 above that the court
could appoint a master to provide assistance in a forum non
conveniens determination. The master would provide specialized
knowledge of the foreign judiciary in question to ensure that the
court renders a decision that comports with the “interest of
justice.”183 If the master’s evaluation falls on the side of concern
about future judgment enforcement or the practices and impartiality
of the foreign judiciary (UFMJRA recognition concerns), a district
court judge may want to exercise his or her discretion to deny the
motion to dismiss and proceed to trial. If the district court disagrees
with the master’s findings, or if the master instead determines that
the foreign judiciary does meet the “interest of justice,” then the
court should stay the action, as opposed to dismissing it. Staying an
action on grounds of forum non conveniens is the subject of the next
section.
B. Second Prong: Staying,
Rather than Dismissing, the Action
It should be no huge secret where the defendant likely retains
assets at the time the defendant files the motion to dismiss for forum
non conveniens.184 If the proposed foreign forum is a country where
the defendant has no assets, the court should recognize that any
future monetary judgment for the plaintiff will have to be enforced
outside of the proposed foreign forum. In all likelihood, since the
plaintiff filed in an American court, the defendant will have assets in
182. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255–56 (1981) (discussing the deference
afforded to a plaintiff’s choice of forum).
183. Stephen B. Burbank offers a biting criticism of American courts’ understanding of
foreign judiciaries that further warrants the specialized knowledge of a master. Professor Burbank
states:
American courts have no coherent or consistent view of the role or weight, if any, that
should be given in forum non conveniens analysis to the constellation of legal rules and
arrangements that determines whether a putative plaintiff has real, as opposed to
theoretical, access to court and to means of proof essential to gain a remedy.
Burbank, supra note 116, at 397. Moreover, should the motion to dismiss not be denied, Professor
Burbank’s observation supports granting a stay, rather than a dismissal, so that the court may
monitor the situation abroad to ensure that a plaintiff is “getting a fair deal.” See infra Part IV.B.
184. For instance, the actions described in Part I were all brought against American
corporations whose principal places of business were in the United States. See supra Part I.

320

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:293

America and a judge can foresee that judgment enforcement in
America may become a contested issue down the road if there are
questions as to the adequacy of the foreign judiciary. Thus, the easy
scenario exists when the master’s findings suggest that the foreign
forum may not be suitable for future potential judgment
enforcement: the court should deny the motion and the parties should
continue on to trial in the district court. But what if the trial judge
grants the motion to dismiss? Doing so relieves the district court of
jurisdiction over the matter. The answer, instead, should be to
conditionally stay the action.
A stay is “[t]he postponement or halting of a proceeding,
judgment, or the like.”185 By conditionally staying an action, the
district court retains jurisdiction over the case while it proceeds in a
foreign judiciary until certain conditions are met, like fulfilling any
judgment in favor of the plaintiff.186 Thus, if the defendant attempts
to invoke the doctrine of judgment enforcement as a “loophole”
mechanism to escape liability, the staying court can resume
proceedings in the matter.187
The following subsections examine California’s practice of
staying an action subject to a motion to dismiss for forum non
conveniens, as opposed to dismissing the action, and suggest that the
federal courts adopt a similar procedure.

185. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1548 (9th ed. 2009).
186. It is not unusual for courts to include conditions, such as the defendant waiving personal
jurisdiction in the foreign forum or any applicable statute-of-limitations defense, under a stay or a
dismissal. See Sussman v. Bank of Isr., 801 F. Supp. 1068, 1079 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (conditioning
the dismissal for forum non conveniens on the defendant waiving any statute of limitations
defense in the foreign forum); Stangvik v. Shiley, Inc., 819 P.2d 14, 17 (Cal. 1991) (“[The trial
court] stayed the actions, and retained jurisdiction to make such further orders as might become
appropriate. The order [staying the action] was subject to seven conditions, with which
defendants agreed to comply.”). The Author recommends that courts should impose another
condition and stay an action until the defendant is relieved of liability, either through fulfilling
any judgment entered against it or by receiving a judgment in its favor by the foreign judiciary.
187. See infra note 208 and accompanying text.
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1. Forum Non Conveniens in California:
Stangvik v. Shiley, Inc.188
Although the doctrine of forum non conveniens was first applied
in California in the mid-1950s,189 the seminal case describing the
Doctrine in California is Stangvik v. Shiley, Inc.190 The case involved
foreign plaintiffs pursuing actions against American corporations in a
California state court.191 The Supreme Court of California granted
review of the actions to “address the question of the appropriate
standards to be applied in deciding whether a trial court should grant
a motion based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens when the
plaintiff [is] a resident of a foreign country.192
The Stangvik court clearly articulated a two-pronged test for
determining whether to grant a motion based on forum non
conveniens.193 Largely relying on the U.S. Supreme Court’s analysis
in Piper Aircraft Co.,194 the California supreme court instructed
courts to conduct a threshold inquiry to determine if the alternate
forum is “suitable” and then balance the private and public interests
at stake.195 Ultimately, the Supreme Court of California affirmed the
lower courts’ decisions to grant the defendants’ motion by staying
the action.196

188. 819 P.2d 14 (Cal. 1991). Families of a deceased Swedish patient and a deceased
Norwegian patient filed a products-liability suit against defendants Shiley, Inc. and its parent
company in a California superior court for manufacturing allegedly faulty heart-valve implants.
Id. at 16. Defendants moved to dismiss or stay the actions on the ground of forum non
conveniens. Id. The trial court stayed the action provided that defendants stipulated to a number
of conditions, including submission to the jurisdiction of the respective foreign forums. Id. at 17
& n.2. The appellate court affirmed, as did the California supreme court. Id. at 17.
189. See id. (citing Price v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 268 P.2d 457 (Cal. 1954)).
190. Stangvik v. Shiley, Inc., 819 P.2d. 14 (Cal. 1991).
191. Id. at 16.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 17.
194. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
195. Stangvik, 819 P.2d at 17–19. As described by the California supreme court in Stangvik,
suitability is based on “whether an action may be commenced in the alternative jurisdiction and a
valid judgment obtained there against the defendant,” id. at 18 n.3, while the private and public
interests to be balanced are similar to those enumerated in Gulf Oil Corp. Id. at 17–18 (citing to
Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 259–61, and Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507–09
(1947)).
196. Id. at 27. Of note is the trial court’s decision to stay the actions as opposed to dismissing
them. Id. at 17. Despite finding the alternative forums to be more appropriate for resolving the
actions, the trial court stayed the actions in order “to make such further orders as might become
appropriate.” Id. (emphasis added).
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2. Forum Non Conveniens in California:
Guimei v. General Electric Co.197
A more recent California case also instructive on addressing
motions to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens is Guimei
v. General Electric Co.198 It similarly involved an American
defendant-corporation and foreign plaintiffs.199 The California
statute200 authorizing dismissal of an action to another forum in the
interest of “substantial justice” also allows for the court to stay the
action.201 Like the court in Stangvik, the trial court in Guimei ordered
the consolidated actions stayed.202 This decision was later affirmed
by a California appellate court.203
In reaching its decision, the trial court engaged in the analysis
required by Stangvik—it determined that both prongs of the forum
non conveniens analysis were met in the consolidated actions.204 As
discussed in Parts II.A and II.B of this Note, a similar analysis is
typical in federal forum non conveniens cases.205 However, unlike
federal forum non conveniens cases, in which dismissals seem to be
the norm should the motions be granted,206 the California supreme

197. On November 21, 2004, China Eastern Yunnan Airlines flight MU5210 crashed in Inner
Mongolia, killing all passengers, crew members, and two bystanders on the ground. Guimei v.
Gen. Electric Co., 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 178, 182 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). Subsequently, plaintiff Guimei,
a relative of a crash victim, along with other plaintiffs, filed suit against defendants General
Electric, Bombardier, Bombardier Aerospace, and China Eastern Airlines Company in a Superior
Court of California for the County Los Angeles. Id. The cases were consolidated and defendants
moved to dismiss or, in the alternative, stay on the ground of forum non conveniens, claiming the
appropriate place for trial was China. Id. at 183. As part of their motion, each defendant made
“commitment[s]” (or stipulations) to several conditions should the motion have been granted. Id.
The trial court granted a conditional stay of the consolidated actions to permit the proceedings in
China and scheduled status conferences for every six months to monitor the progress of the
Chinese proceedings. Id. The California Court of Appeals affirmed the conditional stay. Id. at
193.
198. 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 178 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009).
199. Id. at 182.
200. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.30 (West 2011).
201. Id. § 410.30(a).
202. Guimei, 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 183–85.
203. Id. at 193.
204. See Respondents’ Brief at 11–12, Guimei v. Gen. Electric Co., 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 178 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2009) (Nos. B201016, B201021, B201023, B201012).
205. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,
330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947).
206. See, e.g., Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422 (2007)
(dismissing the action); Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. 235 (dismissing the action).
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court seems to view dismissal as the exception.207 In Guimei, as in
any case in which a stay is granted, the stay allowed the trial court to
retain jurisdiction over the consolidated actions, enabling it to
resume the proceedings if the foreign actions were “unreasonably
delayed” or “fail[ed] to reach a resolution on the merits.”208 Thus, the
trial court could have revisited the question of whether to try the
consolidated actions if the defendants did not follow through with the
stipulations they made or if the foreign judiciary did not accept
jurisdiction over the foreign action.209
The appellate court also noted that if the plaintiffs had
“thwart[ed]” the foreign proceedings, the trial court had the option to
lift the stay and grant a full dismissal of the California action.210 This
makes sense as an appropriate “safety valve” for the defendants who
brought the forum non conveniens motion and who likely made
various stipulations to submit to the jurisdiction of the foreign forum.
By including this “safety valve,” plaintiffs, who face litigating in a
forum not of their choosing, are discouraged from impeding the
foreign proceeding in an attempt to invoke the trial court’s discretion
to remove the stay and try the action. In order to preserve any
safeguard that a stay offers plaintiffs, the plaintiffs must also do their
best to see the foreign proceeding to its conclusion.
Following the edicts set forth by the Stangvik court, the Guimei
court’s decision to employ a conditional stay with periodic reviews
of the status of the foreign action honored the fundamental notions
underlying the Doctrine while protecting, to the best of the court’s
207. Archibald v. Cinerama Hotels, 544 P.2d 947, 950 (Cal. 1976) (“[E]xcept in extraordinary
cases a trial court has no discretion to dismiss an action brought by a California resident on
grounds of forum non conveniens”). It should be noted that this “rule” assumes that the plaintiff
is a California resident. Id. at 950–51. However, the Archibald court goes on to state that “[i]n
considering whether to stay an action, in contrast to dismissing it, the plaintiff’s residence is but
one of many factors which the court may consider.” Id. at 952. California courts also have taken
up the general issue of non-California residents’ choice of forum in the forum non conveniens
analysis, indicating that although a foreign plaintiff’s choice of forum is not a “substantial factor,”
it does deserve some deference. See Stangvik v. Shiley Inc., 819 P.2d 14, 20 (Cal. 1991); Ford
Motor Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 342, 346 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
208. Archibald, 544 P.2d at 950 (noting that a court granting a forum non conveniens stay
retains jurisdiction and “can protect . . . the interests of the [litigants],” while a court granting a
forum non conveniens dismissal loses jurisdiction and “deprive[s] itself of the power to protect
the interests of the [litigants]”).
209. Guimei, 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 191–92 (noting that the trial court’s reviews of the Chinese
action were limited to procedural aspects alone and not the merits of the case).
210. Id. at 192.
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abilities, the plaintiffs’ “day in court.” Ultimately, the power to
resume the original proceedings provides an immeasurable safeguard
against potential problems that litigants may encounter, or may
endeavor to create, in a foreign forum.
C. Third Prong: Masters
Monitoring the International Action
Once a plaintiff refiles an action in a foreign judiciary, how does
the court monitor the adjudication process abroad to ensure the
conditions of the stay are being upheld? Again, as before, the answer
is a master.
As mentioned earlier, courts can charge masters with such
posttrial duties as decree enforcement and investigation.211 FRCP 53
provides the mechanism by which the court has the authority to
reappoint a master to oversee these precise duties.212 By amending
the initial order that approved the master to evaluate the foreign
forum before the trial court ruled on the motion to dismiss for forum
non conveniens, the court can extend the master’s duties to include
monitoring the foreign action to ensure the stay’s conditions are
met.213 In fact, the court could add amending the order as one of the
conditions of the conditional stay.214
Having a master with special knowledge of the foreign judiciary
monitor the progress of the foreign proceeding allows the court to
make highly informed decisions regarding the stay.215 After a court
amends the original order, the master then would be able to
investigate the posttrial proceedings.216 The master’s duties would
not include interfering with the foreign proceedings (which would
implicate issues of comity), but rather would include monitoring and
evaluating what is occurring abroad and reporting back as a neutral
party to the staying court. Thus, the staying court would be able to
211. 9C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 42, §§ 2602–02.1.
212. See FED. R. CIV. P. 53(b)(4) (“The order may be amended at any time after notice to the
parties and an opportunity to be heard.”).
213. 9C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 42, § 2602.1.
214. This is partially because further payment would need to be secured for the master’s
amended duties.
215. See, e.g., Stangvik v. Shiley, Inc., 819 P.2d 14, 17 (Cal. 1991) (staying the actions in
order “to make such further orders as might become appropriate” (emphasis added)).
216. See FED. R. CIV. P. 53(b)(1); 9C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 42, § 2609 (noting that the
order issued by the court may specify or limit the master’s powers).
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make an informed decision as to whether the conditions of the stay
are being met, if the conditions need to be modified, or if the action
needs to be resumed in the staying court.
These three safeguards all work toward one end—ensuring that
the “interest of justice” is served when a federal court declines
jurisdiction over a matter properly before it. The proposed scheme
prevents defendants from abusing an “enforcement loophole” that
has arisen.217 It assures that a defendant properly brought before a
court of law does not escape adjudication.
V. CONCLUSION
By adopting a procedure to stay, rather than dismiss, an action
following a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens, as
California has done, and by enhancing the Doctrine with additional
safeguards as suggested above, the “interest of justice” stands a
better chance of not falling victim to the competing doctrines of
forum non conveniens and judgment enforcement. The proposed
process of (1) appointing a master to impartially evaluate the foreign
forum, (2) staying the action rather than dismissing it, and (3) having
a master monitor the international action encourages a more
searching inquiry in the forum non conveniens determination stage. It
thereby preserves judicial resources should future enforcement
problems be detected early on by an individual with special
knowledge of the foreign judiciary. It also preserves the “interest of
justice” by giving the staying court the power to resume the
proceeding should the action abroad implicate impartiality or dueprocess concerns, as well as if judgment enforcement becomes an
issue. Furthermore, it does not require any alterations to the doctrines
of forum non conveniens or judgment enforcement as they are
currently applied. With the ever-increasing interaction of the world
population and national economies, failure to take this necessary step
in addressing transnational-litigation concerns will result in less and
less foreign reciprocity honoring American judgments and,
ultimately, will result in the unnecessary degradation of America’s
foreign relations.

217. See Weston, supra note 107, at 758–59.
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